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Defendants. ) 
) Case No. 980032-CA 
NOTICE OF ERRATA 
COMES NOW Plaintiff/ Appellant Dorene Lee, by and through counsel, Scott L 
Wiggins, of and for Arnold & Wiggins, P.C, and files this Notice of Errata in the Brief of 
Appellant previously filed with this Court on October 14, 1998. In the course of 
preparing Statement of Fact No. 23 as contained in the Statement of Facts section of the 
Brief of Appellant, Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant inadvertently referred to Mr. Allred, 
the real estate agent, instead of Mr. Dale M. Barnes in reference to reasons given by Mr. 
Barnes for not closing on the scheduled closing date. Therefore, Statement of Fact No. 
23, on page 20 of the Brief of Appellant, for purposes of accuracy, should read as 
follows: 
23. Approximately two days after the scheduled closing, Mr. 
Barnes spoke with Mr. Brad Mortensen, the Manager of Hillam Title 
Company in Brigham City, Utah, informing him that Mr. Barnes "had 
desired to close the transaction at least two to three weeks earlier than the 
date of June 18, 1997 as he was at that time in need of money." (R. 148-49, 
Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, f 7). Mr. Barnes further indicated that "since 
he no longer was in need of money, inasmuch as he had found another 
source of funds, he did not intend to go through with the closing and in any 
event felt that the contract was void." (Id.); 
(italicized and bold emphasis added to show correction). 
DATED this 19th day of October, 1998. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The determination of whether a party is 
entitled to summary judgment is a conclusion of law, which is 
reviewed for correctness with no particular deference given to the 
trial court's ruling. Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. Morgan, 857 
P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 
952, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Plaintiff preserved this issue by 
virtue of the arguments presented to the trial court in the course of 
filing Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the supporting affidavits as well as oral argument 
5 
before the trial court on October 17, 1997 (R. 47-79, Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 80-107, 
Affidavit of Parley Baker; R. 108-23, Affidavit of Dorene Lee; R. 
124-46, Affidavit of Brent A. Kirkland; R. 147-64, Affidavit of Brad 
Mortensen; and R. 215-37, Affidavit of Doug Allred; R. 314-56, 
Transcript of Summary Motion Hearing); 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. As previously discussed, the determination of 
whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a conclusion of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness with no particular deference 
given to the trial court's ruling. Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. 
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. 
Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Plaintiff preserved 
this issue by virtue of the arguments presented to the trial court in 
the course of filing Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
supporting Memorandum, and the supporting affidavits as well as oral 
argument before the trial court on October 17, 1997 (R. 167-68, 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 80-107, R. 171-98, 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for Summary 
Judgment; Affidavit of Parley Baker; R. 108-23, Affidavit of Dorene 
Lee; R. 124-46, Affidavit of Brent A. Kirkland; R. 147-64, Affidavit 
of Brad Mortensen; and R. 215-37, Affidavit of Doug Allred; R. 314-
56, Transcript of Summary Motion Hearing); 
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3. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to her attorney fees and 
costs incurred on appeal in the course of pursuing a reversal of the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants and 
the trial court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The question of »' (wjhether attorney fees are recoverable in an 
action is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.'" 
Wardley Corp., 346 Utah Adv. Rep. at 46 (quoting Selvage v. J.J. 
Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)). 
Plaintiff preserved this issue by virtue of the request and argument 
for attorney fees under REPC in her Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion of Plaintiffs for Summary Judgment (R. 179, Memorandum in 
Support of the Motion of Plaintiffs for Summary Judgment). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 19, 1&97, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in First District 
Court for specific performance and breach of contract, which 
Defendants denied by way of their Answer filed on July 10, 1997. 
Thereafter, on August 19, 1997, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, arguing that the Defendants were under no obligation to 
7 
sell the instant property pursuant to the terms of the REPC inasmuch 
as the closing did not take place on or before April 30, 1997. 
Plaintiffs responded, arguing, among other things, that there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the intended closing date by 
virtue of the terms of the REPC, that Defendants are charged with the 
knowledge of their agent, and that Defendants' conduct with regard to 
the scheduled closing date acted as an estoppel. In support of their 
response, Defendants' also filed several affidavits. 
On September 25, 1997, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment and a supporting Memorandum together with the Affidavit of 
Doug Allred. In the process of so moving, Plaintiffs relied upon the 
previously filed affidavits of Parley Baker, Dorene Lee, Brent A. 
Kirkland, and Brad Mortensen. 
On October 17, 1997, the parties appeared before the trial court 
and argued the motions for summary judgment. That same day, without 
taking the matters under advisement, the trial court granted 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
Thereafter, Defendants' counsel submitted to the trial court 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, together with a proposed Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice. On November 3, 1998, Plaintiffs' trial counsel filed an 
8 
Objection to the proposed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and an 
Objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
On December 2, 1997, the trial court signed the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. The trial court, however, crossed 
out the Findings of Fact and handwrote on page one, "The Court finds 
that there exists no genuine issue of A material Fact", leaving only 
the Conclusions of Law. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Order of Dismissal 
with Prejudice were subsequently entered on December 8, 1997. 
Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal on January 2, 1998, and 
recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on that same day. Defendants 
subsequently filed an additional or cross-appeal on January 20, 1998. 
On April 24, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition, requesting that the Utah Supreme Court dismiss 
Defendants' cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as the 
cross-appeal was untimely filed. On or about May 4, 1997, Defendants 
filed their Response to Plaintiff / Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Disposition. Plaintiff filed her Reply to Defendants' response on 
May 11, 1998. On June 22, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition and dismissed Defendants' 
untimely cross-appeal. 
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On August 7, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the 
instant appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In the latter part of January, 1997, Parley Baker and 
Dorene Lee associated in the business of locating, purchasing, and 
developing real estate in the Tremonton, Utah, area (R. 80, Affidavit 
of Parley Baker, ff 1-2; R. 108-09, Affidavit of Dorene Lee, 1f1f 2-3); 
2. In the process, Mr. Baker contacted Mr. Doug Allred, a real 
estate agent in the Tremonton area (R. 80, Affidavit of Parley Baker, 
% 2; R. 215, Affidavit of Doug Allred, fU 1 and 3). Mr. Allred 
subsequently contacted Mr. Baker and informed him that he had secured 
a listing for the sale of approximately 36.6 acres of property 
located in Box Elder County owned by Dale M. and Diana Jean Barnes 
(R. 215, Affidavit of Doug Allred, %% 2-3; R. 245, Affidavit of Dale 
M. Barnes, %% 2-3; R. 81, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 4); 1 
3. During his conversations with Mr. Allred and in the course 
of preparing with Mr. Allred an offer for purchasing the Barnes' 
lrThe Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure between Mr. Allred and 
the Barnes authorized Mr. Allred and his broker "to represent both 
the Seller and a prospective buyer as Limited Agents'' from February 
2, 1997, to May 5, 1997 (R. 233 and 235, Listing Agreement & Agency 
Disclosure Agreement, %% 1 and 5.10, which is attached as Exhibit 'B' 
to the Affidavit of Doug Allred). In addition, the Listing Agreement 
& Agency Disclosure included explanations concerning "the nature of 
agency relationships between the Seller, the buyer, the Company and 
the real estate agents involved in the a sale of the Property." (Id. 
at R. 233-34) . 
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property, Mr. Baker advised Mr. Allred that he was associated with 
Ms. Dorene Lee (R. 81, Affidavit of Parley Baker, f 5; R. 216, 
Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 7; see also R. 108, Affidavit of Dorene 
Lee, U i ) ; 2 
4. On or about March 6, 1997, Mr. Allred and Mr. Baker met in 
Mr. Allred's office of Coldwell Banker Tugaw Realty, in Tremonton, 
Utah, and prepared an offer for purchasing the Barnes' property by 
way of a Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) (R. 215, Affidavit of 
Doug Allred, f 4; R. 81, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 5). The REPC 
provided, among other things, that the purchase price would be 
$4,000,00 per acre, and that $1,000.00 would be paid as earnest money 
to be held in escrow at Hi11am Title in Brigham City, Utah, with 
$20,000.00 to be paid "at closing - within 90 days" (R. 222, Real 
Estate Purchase Contract, % 2, which is attached as Exhibit B to the 
Affidavit of Doug Allred; R. 81, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 6) . 
The RE£c further provided that the balance of the purchase price 
would be paid to the Barnes over seven and one-half years at the 
interest rate of seven and one-half percent (R. 222, Real Estate 
Purchase Contract, % 2, which is attached as Exhibit B to the 
2The nature of the association between Mr. Parley Baker and Ms. 
Dorene Lee consisted of Mr. Baker being responsible for finding 
property and negotiating the purchase of property for development 
purposes and Ms. Lee, in turn, being responsible for providing the 
financial resources for purchasing and developing the property (R. 
81-82, Affidavit of Parley Baker, %% 6-7; R. 108-09, Affidavit of 
Dorene Lee, 1M 1 and 3). 
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Affidavit of Doug Allred), and that the purchase price of the total 
acreage of the property, i.e., "36 + ACRES'', would be determined by 
survey (Id.; R. 81, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 4); 
5. In the course of preparing the REPC, Mr. Allred informed 
Mr. Baker that the Barnes were interested in closing as soon as 
possible (R. 215, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 5; R. 82, Affidavit of 
Parley Baker, H 7) . Mr. Baker, however, advised Mr. Allred that 
although the funds of his associate, Ms. Lee, were available, they 
would need "at least 60 to 90 days" from the consummation of the 
contract in which to close (R. 82, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 7; R. 
215-16, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 5) .3 Therefore, Mr. Allred and 
Mr. Baker drafted the REPC to include April 30, 1997, as a target 
date for closing (see R. 226, Real Estate Purchase Contract, H 24(e)) 
but with a "90 day closing deadline." (R. 222, Real Estate Purchase 
Contract, f 2.1(b), which is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit 
of Doug Allred; R. 215-16, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 5; see also R. 
82, Affidavit of Parley Baker, f 7); 
6. The Confirmation of Agency Disclosure paragraph of the REPC 
provided that Mr. Allred, as the listing agent, represented "both 
Buyer and Seller as a Limited Agent" (R. 223, Real Estate Purchase 
3Upon learning about the possibility of acquiring the property, 
Ms. Lee informed Mr. Baker that she would need at least a ninety-day 
period from execution of the REPC to the date of closing in order to 
make sure the funds would be available (R. 110, Affidavit of Dorene 
Lee, % 6) . 
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Contract, f 5, which is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of 
Doug Allred) ;4 
7. In the course of negotiating the transaction, Mr. Allred 
advised Mr. Barnes that Mr. Baker "would be purchasing the property 
with a business partner, and that Baker and his partner were planning 
to subdivide and develop it." (R. 216, Affidavit of Doug Allred, % 
7); 
8. On March 7, 1997, Mr. Allred presented the REPC to the 
Barnes, which included Addendum No. 1 and a proposed counteroffer in 
the form of Addendum No. 2 (R. 246, Affidavit of Dale M. Barnes, % 
4The Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure provides the following 
definition of "Limited Agent": 
A Limited Agent represents both seller and buyer 
in the same transaction and works to assist in 
negotiating a mutually acceptable transaction. 
A Limited Agent has fiduciary duties to both 
seller and buyer. However, those duties are 
"limited" because the agent cannot provide to 
both parties undivided loyalty and full 
disclosure of all information known to the 
agent. For this reason, a Limited Agent must 
remain neutral in the representation of a seller 
and buyer, and may not disclose to either party 
information likely to weaken the bargaining 
position of the other, such as, the highest 
price the buyer will pay or the lowest price the 
seller will accept. A Limited Agent must, 
however, disclose to both parties material 
information known to the Limited Agent regarding 
a defect in the Property and/or the ability of 
each party to fulfill agreed upon obligations. 
(R. 234, Real Estate Purchase Contract, f 5.6, which is attached as 
Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Doug Allred). 
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4) .5 After reviewing the same, the Barnes executed the counteroffer 
contained in Addendum No. 2 on March 8, 1997 (Id. at R. 246, f 5; R. 
22 9, Addendum No. 2 to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, which is 
attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Doug Allred); 
9. On March 8, 1997, Mr. Allred contacted Mr. Baker concerning 
the Barnes' counteroffer set forth in Addendum No. 2 attached to the 
REPC (R. 82, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 9). Thereafter, on March 
11, 1997, Mr. Baker executed Addendum No. 3 as a counteroffer to be 
submitted to the Barnes {Id. at R. 82-83, f 9; R. 230, Addendum No. 
3 to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, which is attached as Exhibit 
B to the Real Estate Purchase Contract); 
10. On or about March 18, 1997, Mr. Allred informed Mr. Baker 
that the Barnes had accepted the terms set forth in Addendum No. 3, 
but that Mr. Barnes had added, by his own handwriting to Addendum No. 
3, the following terms: "Balance to be paid over 7 M yrs amortized 
at 8 3/4% (See page one of real estate purchase contract paragraph 
two)" (R. 83, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 9; R. 231, Addendum No. 3 
to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, which is attached as Exhibit B 
to the Affidavit of Doug Allred; R. 246, Affidavit of Dale M. Barnes, 
1 6); 
5Mr. Allred forwarded the REPC, including Addendum No. 1 and the 
proposed Addendum No. 2, by facsimile to the Barnes, who were 
spending the winter in Yuma, Arizona (R. 246, Affidavit of Dale M. 
Barnes, 1f 4) . 
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11. On or about March 20, 1997, Ms. Lee was presented with 
Addendum No. 3, which after reviewing the same, Mr. Lee executed on 
March 20, 1997, at 9:05 a.m. (R. 109, Affidavit of Dorene Lee, % 4; 
R. 83, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 9; R. 232, Addendum No. 3 to the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract, which is attached as Exhibit B to the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract) . On March 21, 19.97, Ms. Lee went with 
Mr. Baker to Mr. Allred's office to review and finalize execution of 
the documents relating to the purchase of the Barnes7 property (R. 
109, Affidavit of Dorene Lee, 1 4; R. 83, Affidavit of Parley Baker, 
H 10) . At that meeting, Mr. Baker and Ms. Lee executed and initialed 
the Document Receipt portion of the Real Estate Purchase Contract (R. 
103 and 119, Real Estate Purchase Contract, true and correct copies 
of which are attached as Exhibit E to the Affidavit of Parley Baker 
and Exhibit No. 2 to the Affidavit of Dorene Lee, respectively). In 
addition, Ms. Lee initialed and/or executed all pages of the REPC, as 
requested by Mr. Allred (R. 109, Affidavit of Dorene Lee, K 4; R. 83, 
Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 10; R. 114-23 and R. 98-107, Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and attached Addendums, which are attached as 
Exhibit No. 2 to the Affidavit of Dorene Lee and Exhibit E to the 
Affidavit of Parley Baker, respectively);6 
6Before executing the REPC, Ms. Lee had arranged for $1000 to be 
deposited as earnest money with Hi11am Title Company pursuant to the 
terms of the REPC (R. 110, Affidavit of Dorene Lee, H 5; R. 222, Real 
Estate Purchase Contract, Earnest Money Receipt paragraph and % 
2.1(a), which is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Doug 
Allred). 
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12. Sometime after March 21, 1997, but prior to April 30, 1997, 
Mr. Barnes contacted Mr. Allred, inquiring whether closing on the 
sale of the property might be held earlier than the 90-day deadline 
set forth in the REPC inasmuch as he needed money (R. 216, Affidavit 
of Doug Allred, f 9). Mr. Allred informed Mr. Barnes that he would 
contact the buyers about his request, but that they probably had the 
right to utilize the full 90 days that began after execution of the 
REPC in which to close (Id.); 
13. Per Mr. Barnes' request, Mr. Allred discussed with Mr. 
Baker the possibility of closing the transaction prior to the 90-day 
period set forth in the REPC (R. 85, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 15; 
R. 216, Affidavit of Doug Allred, % 10) . Mr. Baker, however, 
informed Mr. Allred that such a closing date would not be possible 
because of the additional time needed to obtain a survey and to 
conclude the funding of the transaction (R. 85, Affidavit of Parley 
Baker, H 15-16; R. 215, Affidavit of Doug Allred, % 10). Mr. Baker 
informed Mr. Allred that they certainly would be able to close the 
transaction within the 90-day closing deadline, which began on the 
date that the REPC was finally negotiated and executed in the office 
of Mr. Allred on March 21, 1997 (R. 216, Affidavit of Doug Allred, % 
6). Mr. Allred, in turn, imparted this information to the Barnes (R. 
216, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 10); 
14. Thereafter, Mr. Baker, as part of the business partnership 
between himself and Ms. Lee, performed numerous items in preparation 
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to subdivide the property (R. 84-85, Affidavit of Parley Baker, %% 
12-14) ; 
15. On or about March 21, 1997, Mr. Brent A. Kirkland, the 
Manager of the Hillam Title Agency located in Tremonton, Utah, 
received a copy of the REPC and related Addendums (R. 125, Affidavit 
of Brent A. Kirkland, % 3) . Upon reviewing the REPC and attached 
Addendums, Mr. Kirkland prepared a preliminary title report or title 
commitment setting forth both Mr. Baker and Ms. Lee as the buyers and 
proposed insureds under any title policy to be issued in relation to 
the transaction (Id. at R. 125, % 4; R. 138-46, Preliminary Title 
Report or Title Commitment, a copy of which is attached to the 
Affidavit of Brent A. Kirkland). Mr. Kirkland forwarded a copy of 
the preliminary title report or title commitment to Mr. Allred (R. 
126, Affidavit of Brent A. Kirkland, f 5) ; 
16. Subsequent to the target date of April 30, 1997, Mr. Barnes 
contacted Mr. Allred several times concerning his desire to close the 
transaction (R. 217, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 11). In response, 
Mr. Allred, on each occasion, relayed the information that the buyers 
intended to close on or before June 19, 1997 (Id. at R. 217, f 11); 
17. A closing date of June 18, 1997, was scheduled with Hillam 
Title Company (Id. at R. 217, % 12); 
18. On June 12, 1997, Mr. Barnes went to Mr. Allred's office 
Allred and, in the presence of company employees, informed Mr. Allred 
that he did not intend to proceed with, the closing and. "that all 
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matters were off." (Id. at R. 217, f 13). Mr. Barnes also informed 
Mr. Allred that he had sold the property "to his renters for cash." 
{Id.) . At no prior time had Mr. Barnes indicated that the Barnes did 
not intend to close (Id.). Rather, all prior conversations and 
conduct of the Barnes led Mr. Allred to believe that they intended to 
close on or before June 19, 1997 {Id.). On that same date, Mr. 
Allred attempted to contact Mr. Baker by telephone concerning the 
foregoing and left a telephone message (Id.); 
19. Prior to June 18, 1997, Mr. Allred contacted Mr. Barnes, 
reminding him of the closing scheduled for June 18, 1997 (Id. at R. 
217, % 14). Again, Mr. Barnes indicated that he did not intend to 
close inasmuch as his attorney and another real estate agent had 
advised him that the REPC was invalid (Id.) j 
20. On or about June 17, 1997, Mr. Allred went to Mr. Barnes7 
business to speak with him (Id. at R. 218, % 15) . During that 
conversation, Mr. Barnes showed Mr. Allred the copy of a plat map 
that he had acquired the Hansen & Associates, the engineering company 
that had performed the survey of the property (Id.) . In the course 
of showing him the plat map, Mr. Barnes informed Mr. Allred that he 
could "sell the lots for a lot less than Baker had planned to offer." 
(Id.) Mr. Barnes further indicated that "the lots were his again to 
sell." (Id.) ; 
21. On June 18, 1997, Ms. Lee and Mr. Baker, as the buyers, and 
Mr. Allred, as agent for both parties, appeared at Hillam Title 
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Company in Brigham City for the scheduled closing on the property (R. 
87, Affidavit of Parley Baker, f 21-22; R. 110-11, Affidavit of 
Dorene Lee, ff 7-8; R. 218, Affidavit of Doug Allred, % 16; and R. 
148, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 6; R. 148, Affidavit of Brad 
Mortensen, 1 6). 7 In addition to signing all the relevant documents 
necessary for closing on the property, Ms. Lee tendered a check for 
$20,000 to the title company pursuant to the terms of the REPC (R. 
148, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 6; R. 150-64, HUD-1 Form and 
other closing documents, a copy of which is attached to the Affidavit 
of Brad Mortensen). Neither Mr. Barnes nor Mrs. Barnes appeared at 
the scheduled closing (R. 148, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 6); 
22. The next day, Mr. Barnes contacted Mr. Allred at his 
office, during which Mr. Allred informed Mr. Barnes that the buyers 
had appeared and closed on the transaction (R. 218, Affidavit of Doug 
Allred, f 17). Mr. Barnes asked where the money was, to which Mr. 
Allred responded that "it was at the title company, that they had it 
in escrow, and that they were waiting for him to sign." (Id.). Mr. 
Barnes led Mr. Allred to believe that there was a possibility that he 
might still close (Id.); 
7Upon arriving at the scheduled closing, Mr. Allred communicated 
to Mr. Baker and Ms. Lee that the Mr. Barnes had contacted him, 
refusing to participate in the closing of the property because he 
felt the REPC was unenforceable and because he had already arranged 
a sale of the property to a third party (R. 87, Affidavit of Parley 
Baker, % 22; R. Ill, Affidavit of Dorens Lee, If 8) . 
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23. Approximately two days after the scheduled closing, Mr. 
Barnes spoke with Mr. Brad Mortensen, the Manager of Hillam Title 
Company in Brigham City, Utah, informing him that Mr. Allred "had 
desired to close the transaction at least two to three weeks earlier 
than the date of June 18, 1997 as he was at that time in need of 
money." (R. 149, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 7). Mr. Allred 
further indicated that "since he no longer was in need of money, 
inasmuch as he had found another source of funds, he did not intend 
to go through with the closing and in any event felt that the 
contract was void." (Id.); 
24. On June 19, 1997, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in First 
District Court for specific performance and breach of contract, which 
Defendants denied by way of their Answer on July 10, 1997 (R. 1-16, 
Complaint; R. 21-23, Answer to Complaint). In addition, Plaintiffs 
recorded a Lis Pendens on the subject property (R. 18-20, Lis 
Pendens); 
25. On August 19, 1997, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, arguing that the Defendants were under no obligation to 
sell the instant property pursuant to the terms of the REPC inasmuch 
as the closing did not take place on or before April 30, 1997 (R. 27-
46, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment);8 
8At the time Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, 
they did not file any supporting affidavits. Only on October 16, 
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26. Plaintiffs responded, arguing, among other things, that 
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the intended closing 
date by virtue of the terms of the REPC, that Defendants are charged 
with the knowledge of their agent, and that Defendants' conduct with 
regard to the scheduled closing date acted as an estoppel (R. 47-79, 
Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment). In 
support of their response, Defendants' also filed the following 
affidavits: (1) Affidavit of Parley Baker (R. 80-107); (2) Affidavit 
of Dorene Lee (R. 108-23) ; (3) Affidavit of Brent A. Kirkland (R. 
124-46) ; and (4) Affidavit of Brad Mortensen (R. 147-64) . Defendants 
subsequently filed the Affidavit of Doug Allred (R. 208-11); 
27. On September 25, 1997, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and a supporting Memorandum together with the 
Affidavit of Doug Allred (R. 167-68, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment; R. 171-98, Memorandum in Support of Motion of Plaintiffs 
for Summary Judgment; and Affidavit of Doug Allred, R. 215-37). In 
the process of so moving, Plaintiffs relied upon the previously filed 
Affidavits of Parley Baker, Dorene Lee, and Brent A. Kirkland, 
Manager, Hillam Title Company in Tremonton, Utah, and Mr. Brad 
Mortensen of Hillam Title Company in Brigham City, Utah; 
1997, which was just one day before the hearing on the cross Motions 
for Summary Judgment, did Defendants file the Affidavit of Dale M. 
Barnes (R. 245-54, Affidavit of Dale M. Barnes). 
21 
28. On October 17, 1997, the parties appeared before the trial 
court and argued the motions for summary judgment (R. 314-56, 
Transcript Summary Motion Hearing). That same day, without taking 
the matters under advisement, the trial court granted Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment {Id. at R. 353-55); 
29. Thereafter, Defendants' counsel submitted to the trial 
court proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, together with a proposed Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice (R. 293, Certificate of Service Upon 
Opposing Counsel). On November 3, 1998, Plaintiffs' trial counsel 
subsequently filed an Objection to the proposed Order of Dismissal 
with Prejudice and an Objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 286-88, Objection to Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice); 
30. On December 2, 1997, the trial court signed the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice (R. 287-95, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice). The trial court, however, crossed out the 
Findings of Fact and handwrote on page one, "The Court finds that 
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there exists no genuine issue of A material Fact", leaving only the 
Conclusions of Law (R. 289, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment); 
31. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice 
were subsequently entered on December 8, 1997 (R. Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice); 
32. Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal on January 2, 1998, and 
recorded a Notice of Lis Pendens on that same day (R. 2 97-99, Notice 
of Appeal; Certificates of Mailing (of Notice of Lis Pendens) (R. 
301-04). 
33. Defendants subsequently filed an additional or cross-appeal 
on January 20, 1998 (R. 309-10, Notice of Appeal); 
34. On April 24, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Disposition, requesting that the Utah Supreme Court dismiss 
Defendants' cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction inasmuch as the 
cross-appeal was untimely filed. On or about May 4, 1997, Defendants 
filed their Response to Plaintiff / Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Disposition. Plaintiff filed her Reply to Defendants' response on 
May 11, 1998; 
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35. On June 22, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court granted 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition and dismissed Defendants' 
untimely cross-appeal; 
36. On August 7, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the 
instant appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court not only ignored well-settled legal 
principles concerning agency and estoppel in the course of 
determining that Defendants' were entitled to summary judgment but it 
ignored affidavit evidence showing, at the very least, that there are 
genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Legal 
principles of agency and estoppel, as well as the plethora of 
affidavit evidence presented by Plaintiffs in responding to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment evince, at the very least, 
that there exist issues of material fact precluding summary judgment 
for Defendants; 
2. By ignoring well-settled principles concerning agency and 
estoppel, as well as affidavit evidence presented by Plaintiffs 
showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding 
summary judgment, the trial court erred by determining that 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment. The undisputed 
affidavit evidence also shows that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary 
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judgment in light of their unconditional tender of the performance 
required in the REPC; 
3. Under the real estate purchase contract, Plaintiff is 
entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal in the course of 
pursuing a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of defendants and its denial of Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
j udgment. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT NOT ONLY IGNORED WELL-SETTLED LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES CONCERNING AGENCY AND ESTOPPEL IN THE 
COURSE OF DETERMINING THAT DEPENDANTS' WERE ENTITLED 
TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BUT IT IGNORED AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE 
SHOWING, AT THE VERY LEAST, THAT THERE ARE GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
**[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the appellate 
court] view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" K & 
T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994) (quoting Higgins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). A trial court's 
grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues 
of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Higgins, 855 P.2d at 
235. The determination of whether a party is entitled to summary 
judgment is a question of law, and therefore, the appellate court 
accords no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal 
issues presented. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Ferree v. State, 784 
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P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989); accord Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). In reviewing a trial court's determination as to summary 
judgment, the appellate court "determine[s] only whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court 
correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact." 
Ferree, 784 P. 2d at 151 (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. 
Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 
P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982)) . Further, "[t]he party moving for summary 
judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the applicable 
law as applied to an undisputed material issue of fact." Lamb v. B 
& B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993). 
In the course of determining that Defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
the REPC and addendums "were made between Parley Baker as a buyer and 
Dale M. Barnes and Diana Jean Barnes, his wife", and that "Dorene Lee 
was not a party to the transaction, at least insofar as knowledge, 
could be imputed to the Barnes' [sic] ." (R. 2 91, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusion of 
Law No. 1) .9 In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court not only 
9At the hearing on the Motions for Summary Judgment and in the 
course of pronouncing its ruling, the trial court, without 
explanation, opined that it is a "leap of faith" to argue that Dorene 
Lee was involved as a partner in this transaction (R. 354, lines 4-5, 
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misinterpreted Utah case law concerning principles of agency but it 
totally disregarded undisputed facts presented by way of affidavits 
presented to the trial court by Plaintiffs in the course of 
responding to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The "key relationship" between a real estate agent and a client 
is agency, and "the universal laws applying to principals and agents 
control their rights and responsibilities." Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 
346 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Beech 
Acceptance Corp. v. Connell, Nos. 88-1080-C, 88-1575-C, 1990 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16309, at *14 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 1990). "Agency is xthe 
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by 
one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and 
subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.'" Id. 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) cmt. b (1958)). 
Therefore, uan agency is created and authority is actually conferred 
very much as a contract is made." Id. (citing 3 Am Jur. 2d Agency § 
17 (1986)). Further, "[i]t is well established in the law that a 
principal is liable for the acts of his agent within the scope of the 
agent's authority, irrespective of whether the principal is disclosed 
or undisclosed." Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P. 2d 107, 110 (Utah 
1992). "This is true even though the third person dealing with the 
agent did not learn of the existence of the principal until after the 
Transcript of Summary Motion Hearing). 
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bargain was completed.'' Id. (citing Holman-O.D. Baker Co. v. Pre-
Design, Inc., 104 N.H. 116, 118, 179 A.2d 454, 455 (1962)). 
The aforementioned principles of law directly undermine the 
trial court's reliance upon Conclusion of Law No. 1 in the course of 
granting summary judgment; thereby evincing that the trial court 
improperly granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Listing 
Agreement & Agency Disclosure between Mr. Allred and the Barnes 
authorized Mr. Allred "to represent both the Seller and a prospective 
buyer as Limited Agents" from February 2, 1997, to May 5, 1997 (R. 
233 and 235, Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure Agreement, \ \ 1 
and 5.10, which is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Doug 
Allred). The Barnes executed the Listing Agreement & Agency 
Disclosure on February 2, 1997 {Id.). In addition, the Listing 
Agreement & Agency Disclosure included explanations concerning uthe 
nature of agency relationships between the Seller, the buyer, the 
Company and the real estate agents involved in the a sale of the 
Property." {Id. at R. 233-34). Finally, the Confirmation of Agency 
Disclosure paragraph of the REPC provided that Mr. Allred, as the 
listing agent, represented "both Buyer and Seller as a Limited Agent" 
(R. 223, Real Estate Purchase Contract, % 5, which is attached as 
Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Doug Allred). 
In the instant case, Mr. Allred, as agent for both parties, 
testified by way of his Affidavit that in the course of negotiating 
the terms of the REPC, he had advised Mr. Barnes that Mr. Baker 
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"would be purchasing the property with a business partner, and that 
Baker and his partner were planning to subdivide and develop it." (R. 
216, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 7). Of particular import in the 
instant case is the fact that at no place in any of the documents 
presented by Defendants to the trial court, including Mr. Barnes' 
Affidavit, do Defendants deny that Mr. Allred acted as their agent in 
the course of negotiating the subject transaction. 
Even if the Barnes did not personally know the name of Mr. 
Baker's business partner, Dorene Lee, Mr. Baker had informed Mr. 
Allred, the Barnes' agent, that Ms. Lee was acting as his partner in 
purchasing the property (R. 81, Affidavit of Parley Baker, f 5; R. 
216, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 7; see also R. 108, Affidavit of 
Dorene Lee, 1f 1) . In Foster v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815, 
817 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
It is not always true that a broker who is 
negotiating a transaction must be exclusively 
the agent of one or the other. He way well be a 
"go-between" acting for both. And where he does 
so, with the knowledge and consent of both, each 
is chargeable with notice of the facts the 
broker acquired in the process of the 
negotiations. 
Id. at 817. Based on the foregoing, the Barnes are charged with the 
knowledge that Mr. Baker associated with a business partner, Ms. 
Dorene Lee. See also Utah State Univ. v. Sutro, 646 P.2d 715, 722 
(Utah 1982); Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 551-52 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) . 
29 
The trial court, in arriving at its determination that the 
Barnes were entitled to summary judgment, concluded that the term in 
the REPC, "at closing - within 90 days" did not extend the closing 
deadline but merely referred to the time in which the $20,000 payment 
was to be made (R. 2 91-92, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusion of Law No. 2). 
Such a conclusion ignores the plethora of affidavit evidence 
presented by Plaintiffs in response to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which shows that the parties clearly understood the meaning 
of the term "at closing - within 90 days". 
Mr. Allred, as the agent involved in preparing and negotiating 
the terms of the REPC between the buyers and sellers, testified by 
way of Affidavit that he assisted in drafting the REPC to include 
April 30, 1997, as a target date for closing (see R. 226, Real 
Estate Purchase Contract, % 24(e)) but with a u90 day closing 
deadline." (R. 222, Real Estate Purchase Contract, % 2.1(b), which 
is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Doug Allred; R. 215-
16, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 5; see also R. 82, Affidavit of 
Parley Baker, f 7). Additionally, Mr. Baker, consistent with that 
provided by Mr. Allred, presented affidavit testimony that the 
April 30, 1997, date was a target date for closing, and that the 
term of the REPC requiring payment of the $20,000 "at closing -
within 90 days" was the deadline for closing (R. 82, Affidavit of 
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Parley Baker, % 7). 1 0 Hence, at the very least, based on the 
allegations set forth in the contrasting Affidavits presented by 
the parties, there exists a genuine issue of material fact 
precluding the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 
See K Sc T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P. 2d at 628 (Party "f ailed to 
meet its affirmative burden, as the party moving for summary 
judgment, of establishing that there were no disputed material 
issues of fact."). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Barnes, by virtue of the 
previously discussed principles of agency, were charged with the 
knowledge that the 90-day closing period set forth in paragraph 2 
of the REPC was the closing deadline. This is evinced by the 
affidavit testimony provided by Mr. Allred that sometime after 
March 21, 1997, but prior to April 30, 1997, Mr. Barnes contacted 
Mr. Allred, as agent, and inquired whether closing on the sale of 
the property might be held earlier than the 90-day deadline set 
forth in the REPC inasmuch as he needed money (R. 216, Affidavit of 
Doug Allred, % 9). Mr. Allred further testified that, after 
speaking with Mr. Baker, he imparted th§ information to the Barnes 
10The affidavit testimony provided by Plaintiffs aside, the trial 
court's conclusions of law manifests the ambiguity of the closing 
dates set forth in REPC, which, in turn, underscore, from Defedants' 
perspective, the genuine issues of material fact existing with regard 
to the closing date issue. See Hall v. Process Instruments and 
Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Utah 1995) (discussing 
utilization of parol evidence to clarify ambiguous terms of 
contract); Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262, 1269 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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that the full 90-day period was required to complete the survey of 
the property and to make arrangements for the funding (R. 216, 
Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 10). At no time did the Barnes object 
to the 90-day closing deadline until the instant litigation for 
specific performance was pursued.11 
The trial court in the course of granting summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants also ignored the evidence provided by 
Plaintiffs that Defendants, by virtue of their conduct in the 
course of the transaction, are estopped from relying on the April 
30, 1997, date for closing. Estoppel, as an equitable doctrine, 
requires proof of the following three elements: (1) a statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act by one party that is inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted; (2) the other party's reasonable 
action or inaction that is based on the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second 
l:LThe trial court, in Conclusion of Law No. 5, mistakenly 
concluded that u[e]ven if the terms [sic] xat closing - within 90 
days' could be interpreted to give an additional 90 days from the 
date the contract was agreed to, the 90 days expired before the 
purchasers were able to close." (R. 292, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusion of 
Law No. 5). Inasmuch as the REPC was completed and finally executed 
by Plaintiff on March 21, 1997, the 90-day period set forth in the 
REPC did not expire until June 19, 1997, which is one day after the 
closing at Hi11am Title Company in Brigham City (R. 23 0, Addendum No. 
3 to Real Estate Purchase Contract, which is attached as Exhibit B to 
the Affidavit of Doug Allred; R. 87, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 21-
22; R. 110-11, Affidavit of Dorene Lee, %% 7-8; R. 218, Affidavit of 
Doug Allred, % 16; and R. 148, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 6; R. 
148, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 6). 
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party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict 
or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 
(Utah 1989); van der Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 845 P.2d 
275, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Brixen & Christopher, Architects v. 
Elton, 111 P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In the instant case, Defendants failed to object to the 90-day 
closing deadline set forth in the REPC and communicated to them by 
way of Mr. Allred, as their agent, until shortly before the 
scheduled closing on June 18, 1997 (See R. 245-54, Affidavit of 
Dale M. Barnes; see also R. 216, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 9). 
Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon Defendants' failure to object as 
well as their agreement to the 90-day closing deadline set forth in 
the REPC by performing numerous items in the course of preparing to 
subdivide the property (See R. 84-85, Affidavit of Parley Baker, ff 
12-14). Moreover, Ms. Lee incurred substantial costs and expenses 
for, among other things, a survey, legal fees for resolving water 
issues relating to the property, etc. (R. Ill, Affidavit of Dorene 
Lee, f 9). By allowing Defendants to repudiate such acts or 
failure to act, Plaintiffs suffered injury by virtue of Defendants' 
failure to close on the property. This basically undisputed 
evidence of Defendants' conduct, which warrants the application of 
estoppel, evinces the trial court's improper grant of summary 
judgment for Defendants. 
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II. BY IGNORING WELL-SETTLED PRINCIPLES CONCERNING 
AGENCY AND ESTOPPEL, AS WELL AS AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFFS SHOWING THAT THERE ARE NO 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A trial court's grant of summary judgment is appropriate when 
no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
Because the determination of whether a party is entitled to summary 
judgment is a question of law, the appellate court accords no 
deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues 
presented. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 235; Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 
149, 151 (Utah 1989); accord Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1996). In reviewing a trial court's determination as to 
summary judgment, the appellate court "determine[s] only whether 
the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the 
trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of 
material fact." Ferree, 784 P.2d at 151 (citing Bushnell Real 
Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983); Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982)). "The party moving 
for summary judgment must establish a right to judgment based on 
the applicable law as applied to an undisputed material issue of 
fact." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 
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1993). In reviewing a summary judgment, "the evidence is 
considered in the light most favorable to the losing party," and 
the appellate court affirms "only if there is no genuine dispute as 
to any material fact." Loosli v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 849 P.2d 
624, 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (quoting Themy v. Seagull Enters., Inc., 
595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979)). 
In the course of denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the trial court cryptically concluded in its Conclusions 
of Law that "the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
denied." (R. 2 92, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Conclusion of Law No. 7). The trial 
court, in the course of denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ignored well-settled legal principles of agency, Utah 
case law, and affidavit evidence showing that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, and that Plaintiffs are entitled to summary 
j udgment. 
In the case at bar, the affidavit testimony of Mr. Doug 
Allred, Mr. Parley Baker, and Mr. Brad Mortensen establish that the 
Barnes, at the very least, knew and understood that Plaintiffs 
would close on the subject property within 90 days of signing of 
the REPC (R. 215-16, Affidavit of Doug Allred, %% 5-6, 9-10; see 
also R. 82, Affidavit of Parley Baker, % 7; R. 149, Affidavit of 
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Brad Mortensen, % 7; R. 222, Real Estate Purchase Contract, % 
2.1(b), which is attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Doug 
Allred). In fact, Mr. Barnes acknowledged the 90-day closing 
deadline by virtue of his attempts to have the transaction closed 
after the April 30, 1997, target closing date but before the 90-day 
closing deadline set forth in the REPC (R. 215-17, Affidavit of 
Doug Allred, %% 5-6, 9-12; see also R. 82, Affidavit of Parley 
Baker, f 7). Notwithstanding the fact that the Barnes were 
personally aware of the 90-day closing deadline, the principles of 
agency dictate, as a matter of law, that they, as sellers, were 
charged with knowledge of such inasmuch as Mr. Allred, as their 
agent, was abundantly aware of the 90-day closing deadline. Foster 
v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815, 817 (Utah 1974); see also 
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro, 646 P.2d 715, 722 (Utah 1982); Barker v. 
Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 551-52 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A review of 
the carefully crafted Affidavit of Dale M. Barnes reveals that Mr. 
Barnes does not deny, whatsoever, that Mr. Allred acted as the 
Barnes' agent in the course of negotiating the subject real 
property transaction (See R. 245-54, Affidavit of Dale M. Barnes). 
In fact, in paragraph 3 of his Affidavit, Mr. Barnes admits signing 
the Listing Agreement & Agency Disclosure (Id. at 245, 1f 3) . Even 
more telling, is that Mr. Barnes, in his Affidavit, does not refute 
the allegations set forth in the Affidavit of Mr. Allred, the 
agent, and confirmed in the Affidavit of Mr. Baker, that Mr. Barnes 
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had on numerous occasions inquired about closing the transaction 
before the 90-day closing deadline set forth in the REPC {See id.). 
Finally, the Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, Manager of Hi11am Title 
Company in Brigham City, who is a disinterested party, establishes 
that Mr. Barnes had anticipated closing the transaction well after 
the April 30, 1997, target date for closing but that he no longer 
needed to close on the property "inasmuch as he had found another 
source of funds" (R. 148-49, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 7). 
This is consistent with the Affidavit of Doug Allred, who testified 
that in conversation with Mr. Barnes, Mr. Barnes had admitted 
selling the property to a third party for cash, and therefore, he 
did not intend to close (R. 217-18, Affidavit of Doug Allred, 1M 
13-15). Again, Mr. Barnes does refute the aforementioned 
substantial affidavit testimony. In light of the foregoing, Mr. 
Barnes Affidavit is essentially an attempt to "rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of [their] pleading" and therefore 
constitutes a failure to "set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial." See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
The evidence presented by Plaintiffs in the course of moving 
for Summary Judgment also evinces that Defendants are estopped from 
relying on the April 30, 1997, date for closing by virtue of their 
conduct in the course of the transaction. The equitable doctrine 
of estoppel requires proof of the following three elements: (1) a 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party that is 
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inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) the other party's 
reasonable action or inaction that is based on the first party's 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the 
second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure 
to act. CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists, Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 
969-70 (Utah 1989); van der Heyde v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 
845 P.2d 275, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Brixen & Christopher, 
Architects v. Elton, 111 P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In this case, the affidavit evidence establishes that 
Defendants failed to object to the 90-day closing deadline set 
forth in the REPC and communicated to them by way of their agent, 
Mr. Allred, prior to the scheduled closing on June 18, 1997 (See R. 
245-54, Affidavit of Dale M. Barnes; see also R. 216, Affidavit of 
Doug Allred, % 9). In turn, Plaintiffs reasonably relied upon 
Defendants' failure to object, as well as their agreement and 
consent to the 90-day closing deadline, by performing numerous 
items in the course of preparing to subdivide the property (R. 84-
85, Affidavit of Parley Baker, %% 12-14) . Further, Ms. Lee 
incurred substantial costs and expenses for, among other things, a 
survey, legal fees for resolving water issues relating to the 
property, etc. (R. Ill, Affidavit of Dorene Lee, f 9). By allowing 
Defendants to repudiate such acts or failure to act, Plaintiff 
suffered injury by virtue of Defendants' failure to close on the 
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property. This basically undisputed evidence of Defendants' 
conduct, which warrants the application of estoppel, evinces the 
trial court's improper denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The undisputed affidavit evidence further shows that 
Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment due to their 
unconditional tender of the performance required in the REPC. 
Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992) 
(citing Century 21 All Western Real Estate & Inv. , Inc. v. Webb, 
645 P.2d 52, 56 (Utah 1982); Baxter v. Camelot Properties, Inc., 
622 P.2d 808, 811 (Utah 1981); Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 
P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975)). On June 18, 1997, Ms. Lee and Mr. 
Baker, as buyers, and Mr. Allred, as agent for both sellers and 
buyers, appeared at Hillam Title Company in Brigham City, as 
previously scheduled, to close on the property (R. 87, Affidavit of 
Parley Baker, H 21-22; R. 110-11, Affidavit of Dorene Lee, KU 7-8; 
R. 218, Affidavit of Doug Allred, f 16; and R. 148, Affidavit of 
Brad Mortensen, f 6; R. 148, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 6). 
Upon signing the relevant documents necessary for closing on the 
property, Ms. Lee, pursuant to the terms of the REPC, tendered a 
check for $20,000 to the title company (R. 148, Affidavit of Brad 
Mortensen, % 6; R. 150-64, HUD-1 Form and other closing documents, 
a copy of which is attached to the Affidavit of Brad Mortensen). 
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However, neither Mr. Barnes nor Mrs. Barnes appeared at the 
scheduled closing (R. 148, Affidavit of Brad Mortensen, % 6). 
III. UNDER THE REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT, PLAINTIFF 
IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED ON APPEAL IN 
THE COURSE OF PURSUING A REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS AND ITS DENIAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As a general rule in Utah, attorney fees may be awarded to the 
prevailing party only if allowed by statute or contract. See 
Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994); 
"If provided for by contract, attorney fees are awarded in 
accordance with the terms of that contract." Equitable Life Ins. 
Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); accord 
Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996); Holbrook v. Master Protection 
Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 298 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Thus, in 
determining whether an award of attorney fees is appropriate, the 
appellate court focuses on the language of the attorney fees 
provision in the applicable contract. See Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 
346 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 46 (Utah Ct. App. July 2, 1998); American 
Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 
192 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, granted, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). 
Paragraph 17.1 of the REPC, entitled "ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
- In Actions to Enforce this Contract", provides that xx[i]n the 
event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this 
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Contract, tfre prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and 
reasonable attorney fees." In light of this language, Plaintiff, 
in the event that she prevails on appeal, is entitled to attorney 
fees and co£ts incurred in the course of pursuing the instant 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse the trial court's Order granting Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, reverse trial court's Order denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and remand the case for a 
determination and award of attorney fees in incurred on appeal as 
well as entry of judgment consistent with the Court's opinion. 
STATEMENT REGARDING QPAI, ZIRGUKENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Plaintiff / Appellant requests oral argument because oral 
argument will materially enhance the decisional process due to the 
significant issues in the instant appeal dealing with the specific 
performance under the Real Estate Purchase Contract as well as 
legal principles dealing with agency and estoppel, which are 
matters of continuing public interest and which, based on the facts 
of the instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development 
in the area of real property case development for the benefit of 
bar and public. Counsel for Plaintiff / Appellant further requests 
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that the method of disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion 
designated by the Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of 
precedential value in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Hp) day of October, 1998. 
J& WIGGINS, P.C. 
Attorne^aJror Appellant 
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I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to 
be mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, to the following, on oin< 
this IHm day of October, 1998 
Mr. Jeff R. Thorne 
Mann, Hadfield & Thorne 
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Addendum A 
Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #3250 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Zions Bank Building-98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 435-723-3404 
Facsimile: 435-723-8807 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARLEY BAKER and DORENE LEE, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
Plaintiffs, ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
vs. ) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DALE M. BARNES and DIANA JEAN ) Civil No. 97-478 o, 7
 0 , c o 
BARNES, Y 7 6 
Defendants. ) Judge Clint S. Judkins 
Oral arguments were heard in this matter on October 17, 1997 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
The plaintiff was represented by Jay V. Barney of the firm of Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle P.C. The 
defendants were represented by Jeff R. Thome from Mann, Hadfield & Thome. The Court 
reviewed the Motions, Supporting Affidavits, and Responses filed by defendants and by plaintiffs, 
and the Court being fully familiar in the premises issues the following Findings of Fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Dale M. Barnes and Diana Jean Barnes, his wife, own certain real estate in the • 
Tremonton, Utah vicinity located in Box Elder County. The property has Tax ID #05-08 1-00Q8T 
2. Doug Allred, as a real estate agent for Coldwell Bankers, Tugaw, requested Mr, 
x 1%£ Cou^i TW^.S ~HA-f f i c v e ^/Ci^h /vo 
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Barnes to sign a one party listing and stated that the party who would be purchasing was one 
Parley Baker. 
3. Mr. and Mrs. Barnes were in Yuma, Arizona, where they spend the winj6r months. By 
fax, they received a Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC), with addendums 1/and 2. 
4. The provision dealing with the time for closing is contained in paragraph 24(e) which 
states: Settlement Deadline, April 30, 1997. 
5. The REPC was faxed from the Coldwell Banker-Tugaw'bfEce on March 7, 1997, and 
was signed on March 6, 1997 by one Parley Baker. The page^titled Acceptance/Counteroffer/ 
Rejection was checked with a counteroffer signed only by/Dale Barnes, and his counteroffer was 
contained in Addendum No. 2. While Addendum No/2 gave time for the prospective buyer to 
accept or reject the counteroffer, it did not in anyway extend the time for closing, or settlement. 
6. Parley Baker as buyer, never accepted or rejected the counteroffer with Addendum No. 
1 and No. 2, but did sign an Addendum No. 3 counteroffer dated March 11, 1997 at 11:00 a.m. 
Dale M. Barnes and Diana Jean Barnes, his wife, then accepted the counteroffer of the Parley 
Baker offer and dated their acceptance on March 18, 1997 at 8:00 a.m. (Two documents entitled 
"Addendum, No. 3" (sic) be^rs the signature of a Dorene Lee dated March 20 and 21, 1977. 
That is the first time her^ignature appears. Barnes consider her to be a stranger to the 
transaction, as they had no dealings with her. 
7. None/6f the Addendums ever changed the date of closing, or settlement. 
8. The date of closing or settlement of April 30, 1997 came, and no closing took place. 
The prospective buyer apparently was not willing or able to close on said date. 
/ 
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deadline. 
10. The Court further finds that even if the real estate purchase contract could be 
construed to grant 90 days from the date of signing (March 18, 1997) until closing, the 90 day£ 
expired prior to the time the parties were ready to close, which the court finds to day 
of June, 1997. 
11. The Court finds that Dorene Lee was not a party tcvth^transaction and that her name 
did not appear on any of the documents showing the bijyer until the "addendum number 3" was 
signed by her on March 20 or 21, 1997. Sinc^^e was not named as a buyer in any of the 
previous documents, the court findsthat she was not a purchaser and therefore had no ability to 
extend the time of acceptance. 
12. The Court further finds that the listing agreement expired after May 4, 1997 and 
therefore any claims that Doug Allred was acting as an agent in behalf of Barnes would fail since 
>idid not have any written agent relationship after May 4, 1997. 
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following conclusions: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The real estate purchase contract and addendums were made between Parley Baker as 
a buyer and Dale M. Barnes and Diana Jean Barnes, his wife. Dorene Lee was not a party to the 
transaction, at least insofar as knowledge, could be imputed to the Barnes'. 
2. The real estate purchase contract and addendums were intended to be an integrated 
agreement and the plain language of paragraph 21 states, "21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. 
Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this contract. Extensions must be agreed to 
in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise expressly stated in this contract; (a) performance under 
each section of this contract which references dates shall absolutely be required by 5:00 p.m. 
mountain time on the stated date; and (b) the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be 
counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the timing requirement (i.e., 
Acceptance, receipt of the Seller and Disclosures, etc.)." 
3. The contract required under paragraph 24(e) a settlement deadline of April 30, 1997. 
The settlement deadline passed without the matter being settled. 
4. Under paragraph 2.1(b) the court concludes that the terminology "at closing-within 90 
days" refers to the time in which the $20,000 payment was to be made and does not extend the 
settlement deadline. 
5. Even if the terms "at closing-within 90 days" could be interpreted to give an additional 
90 days from the date the contract was agreed to, the 90 days expired before the purchasers were 
able to close. 
6. The defendants are entitled to a dismissal with prejudice of this cause of action as the 
Court finds that their motion for summary judgment doesn't present any material issues in dispute 
and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
7. The Court finds that the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
DATED this ZL day of October, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UPON OPPOSING COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, counsel for the defendants 
hereby certifies that he served a copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon Jay V. Barney, Attorney for plaintiff, 10885 South State Street, 
Sandy, Utah 84070, by mailing a copy thereof this 2& day of October, 1997. 
ie 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Notice of objection to the proposed documents must be submitted to the Court and 
counsel within five (5) days after service. 
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Addendum B 
Jeff R. Thome of Mann, Hadfield & Thome #3250 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Zions Bank Building-98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 435-723-3404 
Facsimile: 435-723-8807 
EST THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARLEY BAKER and DORENE LEE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 








ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 97-478 
Judge Clint S. Judkins 
Oral arguments were heard in this matter on October 17, 1997 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. 
The plaintiff was represented by Jay V. Barney of the firm of Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle P.C. The 
defendants were represented by Jeff R. Thorne from Mann, Hadfield & Thorne. The Court 
reviewed the Motions, Supporting Affidavits, and Responses filed by defendants and by plaintiffs, 
and the Court being fully familiar in the premises and the Court having issued its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby rules that the plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice^ for the reason that the time for closing CAphed under the Real Estate Puithase^ u 
Contract. Since closing did not take place, the defendants arc under no legal obligation to sell the 
property identified as Tax ID Number 05 081 0008 to the plaintiffs. 
The Court further finds that the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, the 
Court having ruled in favor of defendants. 
i*A*fc~*,fc4*~)Hlfc %9* 1EC08 1997 
DATED this £ OctSber, 1997. 
BY THE COURT 
.LINT s. 
CERTIFICATE OF SEKVIC&'UPON OPPOSING COUNSEL 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, counsel for the defendant 
hereby certifies that he served a copy of the foregoing ORDER Of DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE upon Jay V. Barney, Attorney for plaintifF, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, Utah 
84070, by mailing a copy thereof this ^& day of October, 1997. 
JefFR< 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Notice of objection to the proposed documents must be submitted to the Court and 
counsel within five (5) days after service. 
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